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Abstract
Background: In 2004, a practice charge for physician visits ('Praxisgebuehr') was implemented in
the German health care system, mainly in order to reduce expenditures of sickness funds by
reducing outpatient physician visits. In the statutory sickness funds, all adults now have to pay € 10
at their first physician visit in each 3 month period, except for vaccinations and preventive services.
This study looks at the effect of this new patient fee on delaying or avoiding physician visits, with a
special emphasis on different income groups.
Methods: Six representative surveys (conducted between 2004 and 2006) of the Bertelsmann
Healthcare Monitor were analysed, comprising 7,769 women and men aged 18 to 79 years. The
analyses are based on stratified analyses and logistic regression models, including a focus on the
subgroup having a chronic disease.
Results: Two results can be highlighted. First, avoiding or delaying a physician visit due to this fee
is seen most often among younger and healthier adults. Second, those in the lowest income group
are much more affected in this way than the better of. The multivariate analysis in the subgroup of
respondents having a chronic disease shows, for example, that this reaction is reported 2.45 times
more often in the lowest income group than in the highest income group (95% CI: 1.90–3.15).
Conclusion: The analyses indicate that the effects of the practice charge differ by socio-economic
group. It would be important to assess these effects in more detail, especially the effects on health
care quality and health outcomes. It can be assumed, however, that avoiding or delaying physician
visits jeopardizes both, and that health inequalities are increasing due to the practice charge.
Background
The German health care system has experienced several
reforms in the past years, usually shifting more financial
responsibility to the insured, e.g. by raising co-payments
for prescribed drugs [1]. The analyses presented here focus
on a relatively new reform. Starting on January 1st 2004, a
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practice charge ('Praxisgebuehr') of   10 for the first con-
tact at a physician's or dentist's office in each 3 month
period was introduced as part of the 'Statutory Health
Insurance Modernization Law' (§28, clause 4, SGB V). All
statutory insured, aged 18 years or older, are affected by
this new arrangement. Approximately 90% of the German
population has statutory health insurance while the
remaining 10% (mainly self employed, civil servants and
high income groups) are covered by private health insur-
ance.
The practice fee is not charged for preventive medical serv-
ices, such as cancer screenings, examinations to ensure a
normal pregnancy, general health checks (for people
above 35 years of age) and dental prophylaxis. It is paid in
cash at the doctor's office, then sent to the statutory health
insurance (i.e. the physician has to ask the patient for this
money, but cannot keep it). In the statutory health insur-
ance, there is an upper limit for the annual out-of-pocket
payments, i.e. no insured has to pay more than 2% of his
or her gross annual income. For those with a chronic dis-
ease, the upper limit has been reduced to 1%. The practice
charge is added to other out-of-pocket payments (e.g. for
drugs or for dentures), and it is assumed that it does not
put undue financial burden on the insured. It is important
to point out that there is inadequate empirical data sup-
porting this assumption. H. Reiners and M. Schnee,
though, analyzed data of the Healthcare Monitor in 2007
and their results suggest that the effects of the practice fee
are not distributed evenly [2]. Apparently, people with a
lower socio-economic status are more affected and clearly
tend to avoid or delay physician visits because of the fee.
The introduction of a fee for physician visits has been jus-
tified by three arguments: first, utilization of ambulatory
medical services is rather high in Germany [3]. The fee is
intended to discourage patients from inappropriate (i.e.
superfluous) physician visits. The theorem of 'moral haz-
ard' states that the insured in a statutory health insurance
have no incentives for reducing their health care utiliza-
tion, but try to make the most of their given financial con-
tribution. It has often been quoted for justifying the
necessity of co-payments, and the same has been true for
the practice charge. Second, the fee helps to reinforce the
'gate keeper' role of the general practitioner (GP), as the
GP can decide whether the patient should see a specialist,
and as the patient has to pay the fee only once in each 3
months period (i.e. if referred, no additional fee has to be
paid). Third, it is expected that the expenditures of the
statutory health insurance will be reduced, at least in the
short run. This financial gain is thoroughly wished for, as
limiting the expenditures has been a major objective of all
past health care reforms in Germany.
Today, more than four years after its implementation, dis-
cussion about the effects of the practice charge is still
highly controversial. The major questions are, whether
'important' physician visits are reduced (not just 'unim-
portant' ones) and whether socio-economic inequalities
are intensified, as it is well known in Germany that mor-
bidity and mortality are greater in low status groups [4],
and that these groups are more heavily affected by addi-
tional financial burdens. There are very few studies look-
ing at potential effects in more detail, they are using
different data sources and they reach different conclu-
sions. A survey of the Bertelsmann foundation (Health-
care Monitor) in spring 2004 (i.e. shortly after the
introduction of the practice charge) shows: 55% of the
insured say that the new fee has influenced their health
care behaviour in some way, and among these 27% report
delayed physician visits, while 35% avoided them com-
pletely and tried to cure themselves. Also, 38% had an
additional visit in order to obtain a referral to a specialist.
Until autumn 2005, the proportion of 'delayers' increased
to 42%, while the proportion of 'avoiders' declined to
25%. Also, the average number of physician visits
decreased by 8% from 2003 to 2005 [5-7].
Another study conducted by the Scientific Institute
(WIdO) of the largest statutory sickness fund (i.e. the
AOK) found that in 2004 11.7% of the insured delayed a
physician visit or avoided it altogether because of the
additional fee [8]. In the following year, this proportion
declined to 9.4% [9]. Also, the number of referrals
increased between 2004 and 2005. Finally, an analysis of
data from the 'Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP)' for the
period between 2003 and 2005 did not find any signifi-
cant effects of the fee on patient behaviour, which may be
due to the fact that a very different source of data was used
[10].
It is important to stress that the question of whether the
fee puts a special burden on the insured from low status
groups has yet to be fully answered. There are some hints
indicating that low status groups are more influenced
than high status groups, for example the Healthcare Mon-
itor surveys and the study 'Living in Europe 2005' of the
German Federal Statistical Office [11]. The analyses based
on the SOEP study [10] and the WIdO study in 2005 [9]
did not find any differences between socio-economic
groups, but these analyses have been rather simple and
purely descriptive. Some papers have been published on
the potential effects of consultation fees and co-payments
[12], however there is a special need for more extensive
empirical analyses. The study presented here aims at pro-
viding more detailed information on the influence of the
consultation fee on patient behaviour, with a special focus
on differences by socio-economic status. Our study
hypothesis is that patients who are socio-economically
disadvantaged will delay or even avoid physician visits to
a larger extent than patients with more favourable socio-
economic backgrounds.BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
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Methods
The Bertelsmann foundation is an independent, non
profit foundation, focussing on its own projects according
to the objective of its founder [13]. Since 2001, it has con-
ducted the 'Bertelsmann Healthcare Monitor', a series of
surveys in a representative sample of the German popula-
tion. Two surveys are conducted each year, one in spring
and one in autumn. The sampling procedure is embedded
in the 'German TNS Infratest Access Panel', comprising a
representative sample of about 180,000 adults speaking
German aged 18 to 79. From this pool, new independent
cross sectional samples are drawn for every survey. The
questionnaire for the Healthcare Monitor surveys includes
about 26 pages and 130 questions. It is mailed to the par-
ticipants. A group of basic questions is always identical;
the other questions vary according to new research topics.
The average response rate is about 70%, resulting in data
from approximately 1,500 respondents per survey. The
quality of the data is assured by a permanent monitoring
process [14]. Thus, the Bertelsmann Healthcare Monitor
has been established in the scientific field as a good and
important data source, and a number of publications have
already been based on it (e.g. [15-18]).
The German Infratest Access Panel has been compared, for
example, with data of the Statistical Yearbook of Ger-
many. The comparison shows a very good match with the
age structure and with the distribution of the population
in the administrative regions (as they are defined by the
Federal Agency of Statistics). A good match can also be
seen with the gender-specific rates of hospital discharge
statistics, and with the prevalence of self reported medical
conditions as assessed by the German National Health
Survey [19]. The Healthcare Monitor draws cross sectional
samples from the Access Panel that are representative for
the German population concerning age, gender and
region.
The questionnaire has not been supervised by an ethics
committee, since the Healthcare Monitor is not a clinical
trial; thus, ethical approval was not required. TNS Infratest
follows the guidelines of the ADM (official group of the
German market research of social science institutes) as
well as the European standards of the ESOMAR and the
German data protection directive.
All available surveys including the following question on
the new patient fee are comprised in the analyses, i.e. sur-
veys 6 (spring 2004) to 11 (autumn 2006). The question
reads: Because of the practice charge, and during the past
3 months (i.e. 'quarter'), did you (a) delay a physician
contact [e.g. wait for the near end of the quarter], (b)
avoid a physician contact [and cure yourself without pro-
fessional treatment] or (c) make an additional physician
contact [in order to obtain a referral to a specialist]? Not
marking any of these three categories indicates that the fee
had no influence on the participant's behaviour concern-
ing physician visits. The analyses focus on those who did
mark one of the three answers, and it should be noted that
these three categories are mutually exclusive. Thus, the
dependent variable is the percentage of participants who
have delayed or avoided a physician visit due the patient
fee, among all participants who have answered the ques-
tionnaire.
The following variables are included as well:
- per capita net household income per month: five groups,
each covering about 20% of the sample (included as the
main independent variable)
- number of the survey (six waves from spring 2004 to
autumn 2006)
- age (six groups)
- gender
- difficulty to pay co-payments: This question has three
answer categories: not difficult, somewhat difficult, very
difficult. The corresponding question reads: 'Is it difficult
for you to afford co-payments for prescribed drugs?'
- health awareness: The participants were asked how much
attention they generally pay to their health, and could tick
one of the following categories: very much, much (these
two categories are combined in the analysis to 'strong
health awareness'), medium, little, no attention at all (the
last two categories are combined to 'little health aware-
ness').
- self assessed health: This question has five answer cate-
gories that were combined to three categories indicating
good, medium or poor health.
- presence of a chronic disease (yes, no): The question-
naire asks about the presence of 18 different chronic dis-
eases (e.g. hypertension, myocardial infarction, asthma).
If at least one of them was marked, the respondent was
characterized as having a chronic disease.
- reduction of the maximum co-payment to 1% of the
income due to a chronic disease (yes, no): As already men-
tioned above, insured with a chronic disease have to pay
only a maximum of 1% of their gross income for co-pay-
ments (and not 2% as the other insured), but first the stat-
utory sickness fund has to accept their application for this
reduced upper limit.
The analyses are restricted to those participants who were
insured in the statutory sickness funds. The association
between the dependent and the independent variables areBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
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first tested by Chi-square statistics. Only those independ-
ent variables yielding a significant association (p = 0.05)
are kept for further multivariate analyses. Multicollinear-
ity is tested by the variance inflation factor (VIF), with val-
ues above 5.0 indicating problems of multicollinearity
[20]. Logistic regression models were computed including
or excluding the variable 'difficulty to pay co-payments',
and including all insured or only those with a chronic dis-
ease. In order to additionally assess the influence of miss-
ing values, complete case analyses were conducted and
analyses including missing values by separate dummy cat-
egories. The quality of the logistic regression models is
assessed by the c-value, and the Hosmer Lemeshow Test.
The c-value describes the area under the ROC-curve. A
value of 1.0 indicates that all cases are classified correctly,
while 0.5 marks a model of random correlations. In epi-
demiologic studies, values between 0.6 and 0.8 are usu-
ally regarded as being satisfactory. The Hosmer Lemeshow
test is applied to all models. Observed and predicted val-
ues are compared with each other, and if there is no signif-
icant difference (at the significance level of 0.05) the
model is characterised as being appropriate. Finally,
Nagelkerke's and McFadden's pseudo-R2s have been com-
puted in order to give an impression of the variance
explained by the variables in the models, a value of 0 indi-
cating no and of 1 indicating full model fit. The software
'SAS Version 9.13' has been used in all analyses.
Results
Univariate models
The data set, including surveys 6 (spring 2004) to 11
(autumn 2006), comprises people covered by different
insurance funds and one person aged 17. We included
only those who were 18 years of age or older and insured
in statutory sickness funds, i.e. 7,769 individuals. 505
respondents (6.50%) did not give the information on
their income and another 66 (0.85%) did not answer one
of the other questions included in these analyses.
The respondents who did not answer the question on
their income were compared to the other respondents
who provided this information. The results show that the
former somewhat less often avoided or delayed a physi-
cian visit due the 'Praxisgebuehr', that they less often had
to pay a maximum of just 1% of their income for co-pay-
ments, and that they more often said that paying the co-
payments was no big problem for them. Furthermore,
non-reporting of income was seen more often for women
than for men. All other variables show no significant dif-
ferences between those who gave the information on
income and those who did not. It is concluded that miss-
ing values for income do not occur completely at random,
that it is often the higher income groups and the more
healthy participants who do not provide this information.
As the number of missing values is rather small, the bias
introduced can probably be neglected, though.
The characteristics of the study population are shown in
Table 1. Since the distribution of the variables remained
rather stable across the different surveys (except the out-
come variable), we report only percentages based on the
total sample including all six surveys.
Concerning the outcome variable, about 27% of all partic-
ipants delayed a physician visit, 18% avoided a visit, 25%
made an additional visit, and 30% did not report any
change in their behaviour due to the practice charge. Over
the course of the six surveys, the proportion of delayers
and avoiders changed considerably (see Figure 1), notably
the percentage of delayers with a peak in autumn 2005
and spring 2006, while the percentage of avoiders
remained relatively constant at about 18%.
The percentage of respondents reporting delayed or
avoided physician contacts is calculated for each survey,
for different age groups, income groups, by difficulty to
pay the co-payments and for participants with or without
a chronic disease (see Figures 2 to 5). As illustrated in Fig-
ure 2, avoiding or delaying physician contacts strongly
depends on the age of the participants: the percentage
clearly decreases with increasing age and the difference
between the age groups is statistically significant (chi2/5
degrees of freedom = 399.43, p-value < 0.0001; univariate
logistic model: under 30 years versus over 70: OR = 4.83,
CI 3.94–5.91, β = 1.57, se(β) = 0.10, all other age groups
– taking 'over 70 years' as a reference – are also significant)
A similar comparison between women and men does not
show major differences concerning avoiding or delaying
physician visits. Concerning 'per capita income', though,
a clear trend emerges (see Figure 3): In autumn 2005, i.e.
the survey with the highest percentage of delayers and
avoiders, this percentage is 67.9% among those with very
little income (less than 600 Euro), compared to 'only'
42.6% among those with very high income (more than
1,300 Euro). This difference is rather stable over time, i.e.
these two curves remain rather parallel between spring
2004 and autumn 2006 (OR including all waves, univari-
ate logistic model = 2.68, CI 2.32–3.10, β = 0.99, se(β) =
0.07). Comparing the other income groups with the refer-
ence 'more than 1,300 Euro' also reveals significant ORs.
The three middle income groups are combined into one
curve in this Figure, as the three separate curves more or
less overlap. As illustrated by Figure 4, a very similar pic-
ture can be seen when the percentages avoiding or delay-
ing physician visits is displayed by the difficulty to pay co-
payments: The participants who say that it is difficult to
spare the money for the co-payments show a much higher
percentage than those who say that paying the co-pay-BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
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ments is easy. And again the curves remain rather parallel
between spring 2004 and autumn 2006 (OR univariate
including all waves = 2.0, CI 1.77–2.25, β = 0.69, se(β) =
0.06).
Concerning the variables assessing health and health
awareness, interesting associations can be seen as well
(not all data shown here in separate Figures). In spring
2006, for instance, 43.45% of participants with strong
health awareness delayed or avoided physician contacts,
compared to 69.74% of those with little interest in their
own health (OR univariate including all waves, little inter-
est versus strong interest = 1.67, CI 1.40–2.00, β = 0.51,
se(β) = 0.09). Those who assess their health status as
Table 1: Characteristics of the study population
N miss N n %
Survey 07 , 7 6 9
spring 2004 1,393 17.93
autumn 2004 1,260 16.22
spring 2005 1,343 17.29
autumn 2005 1,273 16.39
spring 2006 1,218 15.68
autumn 2006 1,282 16.50
Socio-economic variables
Age (years) 07 , 7 6 9
18–30 1,146 14.75
31–40 1,501 19.32
41–50 1,543 19.86
51–60 1,241 15.97
61–70 1,561 20.09
71–79 777 10.00
Gender 07 , 7 6 9
female 4,508 58.03
male 3,261 41.97
Per capita income per month (Euro) 505 7,264
< 600 1,659 22.84
600–800 1,582 21.78
800–1,000 1,141 15.71
1,000–1,300 1,363 18.76
> 1,300 1,519 20.91
Co-payments 192 7,577
very difficult 1,765 23.29
somewhat difficult 2,841 37.50
not difficult 2,971 39.21
Health related variables
Health awareness (HAW) 38 7,731
strong 3,854 49.85
medium 3,360 43.46
little 517 6.69
Self assessed health (SAH) 36 7,733
good 2,055 26.57
medium 3,961 51.22
poor 1,717 22.20
Chronic disease 07 , 7 6 9
yes 3,817 49.13
no 3,952 50.87
Maximum co-payment of 1%a 07 , 7 6 9
yes 1,096 14.11
no 6,673 85.89
Outcome variable due to practice charge 07 , 7 6 9
effect 'yes' { delayed physician visit 2,075 26.71
avoided physician visit 1,400 18.02
additional physician visit 1,937 24.93
effect 'no' none of the above 2,357 30.34
a accepted by the sickness fund as being chronically sickBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
Page 6 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
being 'very good' avoid or delay physician contacts twice
as often as those who say that their health is poor (OR
univariate including all waves = 2.0, CI 1.74–2.27, β =
0.69, se(β) = 0.07). Figure 5 shows the associations by
presence or absence of a chronic disease. Not surprisingly,
the shape of the curves resembles those of the general
health status (SAH), demonstrating that even a high per-
centage of patients with a chronic disease avoid or delay
physician visits due to the extra fee (OR univariate includ-
ing all waves, no chronic disease versus chronic disease =
1.90, CI 1.73–2.07, β = 0.64, se(β) = 0.05). Finally, those
who pay a maximum of only 1% of their income for co-
payments (due to a severe chronic disease) avoid or delay
physician contacts to a lesser extent than those who pay
the standard of 2% (OR univariate including all waves,
2% versus 1% = 2.4, CI = 2.10–2.77, β = 0.88, se(β) =
0.07).
Multiple logistic regression analyses
The results of the multiple logistic regression analyses are
presented in Table 2. They are based on a backward selec-
tion process, and the models comprise complete cases
only (N = 7,198). The test for multicollinearity does not
reveal significant problems (i.e. the variance inflation fac-
tor does not exceed the critical value of 5). The correlation
between two variables is still rather high though, i.e.
between 'difficulties paying the co-payments' on one
hand and 'per capita income' on the other. This is why the
variable 'difficulties paying the co-payments' is excluded
from the models presented below (but major changes
occurring when this variable is included are reported in
the text). Various interaction terms were tested, but later
withdrawn, because no interaction term was statistically
significant in the full model.
Four models are presented here, two models with the out-
come variable 'delayed or avoided physician visits' (see
models 1 and 2), one model restricted to the outcome
'delayed' (model 3) and one model restricted to the out-
come 'avoided' (model 4). Also, one model is restricted to
the subgroup of those with a chronic disease (model 2).
Due to formal integrity, the variables 'gender' and 'self
assessed health' are included in the Table as well,
Percentage of participants who have avoided or delayed physician visits due to the practice charge Figure 1
Percentage of participants who have avoided or delayed physician visits due to the practice charge.
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although they do not show statistically significant associ-
ations with the dependent variables.
People under 30 years of age are more than three times
(OR = 3.46, CI 2.72–4.39, β = 1.24, se(β) = 0.12) more
likely to avoid or delay physician visits because of the
practice charge than people older than 70 years (model 1).
For those aged 31 to 40 years it is 2.47 (CI 1.97–3.11)
times, for those aged 41 to 50 years 1.94 (CI 1.56–2.43)
times, for those aged 51 to 60 years 1.89 (CI 1.52–2.36)
times, and for those aged 61 to 70 years 1.46 (CI 1.18–
1.80) times (odds ratios not presented in the Table). Thus,
a clear age gradient emerges (as already seen in Figure 2).
Very similar odds ratios are derived for age in all other
models. The non-significant association with the variable
'gender' can also be seen in all models. Concerning the
variable 'per capita income', the odds ratios for all catego-
ries are shown in Table 2, since this parameter is the main
independent variable in these analyses. Participants with
less than   600 are about 2.3 times more likely to delay or
avoid physician visits than those with more than   1,300
(model 1, OR = 2.31, CI 1.98–2.70, β = 0.84, se(β) =
0.08). This association is even somewhat stronger in the
subgroup of the participants with a chronic disease
(model 2). If the variable 'difficulties with co-payments' is
included, the odds ratios of 'income below   600'
decreases to 1.54 (CI: 1.30–1.83) in model 1 and 1.61
(CI: 1.23–2.12) in model 2. Some of the odds ratios for
the other income groups are clearly significant as well and,
broadly speaking, an increasing odds ratio with decreas-
ing income can be seen. The odds ratios for 'difficulties
paying co-payments' versus 'no difficulties' are 2.67 (CI:
2.29–3.11) in model 1 and 2.62 (CI: 2.11–3.27) in model
2 (not shown in Table 2).
'Health awareness' plays a bigger role in model 2 than in
model 1, while 'self assessed health' is not significant in
both models. The participants who contribute a maxi-
mum of 2% of their annual income to co-payments are
1.77 times (model 1, β = 0.57, se(β) = 0.08) or 1.71 times
(model 2, β = 0.54, se(β) = 0.09) more likely to delay or
avoid physician visits than those who need to pay only
1% (due to a severe chronic disease). As has been dis-
cussed above, the prevalence for delaying or avoiding phy-
sician visits changes considerably between the six waves.
We tried to adjust for this by including an additional var-
iable 'survey spring 2006 versus survey spring 2004' (i.e.
by comparing the first survey with the last available survey
that has been conducted in the same time of the year). The
results show that the prevalence is about 2 times as high
in spring 2006 (OR = 1.95, CI 1.65–2.31, β = 0.67, se(β)
= 0.09) compared with spring 2004.
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by age Figure 2
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by age.
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In other models (Tables not shown here), we excluded the
variables 'survey' and 'maximum co-payment of 1%', but
the odds ratios for the key variable 'per capita income' do
not change very much. For the lowest income group, for
example, they are 2.24 (CI: 1.92–2.61) including all par-
ticipants, and 2.25 (CI: 1.76–2.88) including only those
with a chronic disease. Also, we conducted additional
analyses with all missing values included by separate
dummy variables, but again the odds ratios did not
change remarkably. For instance, the probability of peo-
ple with less than   600 to avoid or delay physician con-
tacts changes from 2.31 (model 1) to 2.32 (CI: 1.99–
2.71). It is also important to stress that the dummy varia-
ble 'no information on income' is not significantly related
to avoiding or delaying physician contacts (OR = 1.24).
The analyses differentiating between the outcome
'delayed' on one hand and 'avoided' on the other yield
some additional information. The associations for age,
per capita income, health awareness and absence of a
chronic disease are especially large for the outcome
'avoided' (i.e. the more extreme outcome).
The c-values of all models are satisfactory. Likewise, all
Hosmer Lemeshow tests are not significant, indicating
good model appropriateness. Nagelkerke's and McFad-
den's Pseudo R2 are very small, though, indicating that the
selected independent variables are not sufficient for fully
explaining the variance of the outcome variable.
Discussion
The prevalence of 'delayed or avoided physician visits'
increased from 35.8% in spring 2004 to 46.8% about six
months later, stayed high until spring 2006 and decreased
to 35.7% in autumn 2006. Also, most subgroups of the
respondents (e.g. defined by age and income) showed a
very similar increase and decrease over the course of these
six surveys. It can be concluded that it took some months
for the reaction to this new regulation to fully develop,
that about 21/2 years after its implementation its effect
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by per capita income Figure 3
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by per capita income.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Spring
2004
Autumn
2004
Spring
2005
Autumn
2005
Spring
2006
Autumn
2006
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
s
less than € 600
€ 600-1300
more than € 1300BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
Page 9 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
started to diminish, and that the social differences in this
reaction remained rather stable in this period.
However, it is difficult to fully explain the observed time
trend and especially the sharp decline between spring and
autumn 2006, because avoiding or delaying physician vis-
its is a very complex issue with many influencing factors.
The question concerning the physician charge was identi-
cal in all surveys and no major political change took place
in this time period. It has to be stressed, though, that the
association of primary importance here (e.g. between
income on one hand and delayed or avoided physician
visits on the other) remains surprisingly stable in all six
cross-sectional surveys (with different persons included in
each survey). If possible, future studies should be based
on a longitudinal design, as this allows for a much more
precise assessment of time trends (and causal effects), of
course.
Younger people were more likely to avoid or delay a phy-
sician visit than older. This is rather plausible, as usually
they are healthier than older people and need to see a phy-
sician less urgently. The age gradient can still be seen after
controlling for self assessed health and the presence of a
chronic disease. This is probably due to the fact that the
need to see a physician is not fully adjusted for by these
two health variables. As expected, those who state that
their health is poor or that they have a chronic disease
delay or avoid a physician visit less often than those who
are healthier (see Figure 5). Controlling for the other var-
iables in the logistic regressions, though, the influence of
these health indicators is rather small. It is significant only
in the model focussing on the outcome 'avoided' (see
Table 2, model 4). A third possibility to assess the pres-
ence of a chronic disease is presented by the variable 'max-
imum co-payment 1%'. Whereas about 49% of all
participants state that they have a chronic disease, only
about 14% state that they are exempt from the standard of
'maximum co-payment 2%' (see Table 1), clearly pointing
to the fact that the indicator 'maximum 1%' indicates the
presence of more severe diseases. This is probably the rea-
son why this indicator for health shows the strongest asso-
ciation with the dependent variables.
Concerning the independent variable of primary impor-
tance here, i.e. income, the bivariate analyses clearly show
that delaying or avoiding physician visits is reported most
often in the lowest income group (see Figure 3). The asso-
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by difficulty to pay co-payments Figure 4
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by difficulty to pay co-payments.
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ciation can also be seen in the multivariate analyses. In the
subgroup of respondents having a chronic disease, for
example, this reaction is reported in the lowest income
group 2.45 times more often than in the highest income
group. Also, a dose response association can be seen here
(i.e. decreasing odds ratios with increasing income).
The fact that the Pseudo R2 values are rather small indi-
cates that the variables included here are not sufficient to
fully explain the variance of the outcome 'delayed/
avoided'. We selected the independent factors after testing
them for univariate significance and could of course only
choose among those characteristics that had been
included in the original study questionnaire. It is quite
probable that a number of other aspects play a role in a
patient's decision to consult a physician or not, namely
his or her time budget, good or bad past experiences,
travel distances to the physician's office, the physician-
patient relationship or language barriers.
The results of the logistic regression can be used to calcu-
late prognostic scores. Taking model 1 (Table 2), for
example, the minimal risk score is obtained for a male
person, who is more than 70 years old, earns more than
1300   per month, has strong health awareness but poor
self assessed health, has a chronic disease, pays only 1%
for co-payments and has participated in the survey of
spring 2004. His probability to delay or avoid a physician
contact because of the practice charge is only 7.38%,
whereas it is 81.62% for a young woman with the maxi-
mum risk profile. Thus, the odds ratio of a person at max-
imum risk (as compared with a person at minimum risk)
reaches 55.72. These calculations are just intended to
illustrate best and worst case situations. In reality, very few
people belong to these extreme categories (in our study 8
old men and 5 young women).
The data used in this analysis are obtained by consecutive
cross-sectional surveys. There is no follow up information
per person over time, and therefore it is difficult to assess
causality. It seems to be rather plausible, though, to
assume that income has a causal effect on avoiding or
delaying physician contacts due to the practice charge.
Another problem is of primary concern here: The need to
see a physician could only be assessed in a crude way, i.e.
by taking into account measures of health and chronic
disease. The final objective should be to analyse the health
effects of delaying or avoiding physician visits, and this
will only be possible with a better assessment of the need
to see a physician, and with follow up information on
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by presence of chronic disease Figure 5
Avoided or delayed physician visits: by presence of chronic disease.
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health. Future studies should try to fill this gap. The
present analysis can just point to the fact that negative
health consequences of the new 'Praxisgebuehr' are prob-
ably most prevalent in the lowest income group (thus
increasing health inequalities). Another limitation of the
study is the fact that we could not assess if a person was
exempt from the physician fee during the time period
asked for in the survey (past three months). Most people
accumulate their bills and ask for refund by the end of the
year, but other may apply for exemption before the end of
the year; these details are not asked for in the question-
naire, though.
Co-payments have been introduced in many industrial
countries in order to minimize health insurance expendi-
tures, to close budget gaps in the public health sector and
to restrict moral hazard. As mentioned above, the concept
of insured people 'over-using' insurance services is derived
from insurance theory. M.V. Pauly hypothesised in 1968
that such 'excessive' demands could be depleted effec-
tively by monetary hurdles such as co-payments [21].
However, health care systems are very different from other
markets regulated by supply and demand. Patients cannot
choose treatments and medications like TV sets or beer
brands, but have to rely on physician's decisions and rec-
ommendations. Moreover, medical services and products
are rarely a matter of taste like luxury goods.
In particular, socio-economically disadvantaged people
tend be less concerned about their own health [4], even if
medical services are offered free of charge (such as preven-
tive medical services in Germany), and co-payments can
be an important additional financial hurdle. H. Reiners
argues that the moral hazard concept is utterly misplaced
in the public health sector, and that it is more plausible to
assume that physicians are 'over-using' the system by
inducing demand [22]. The moral hazard argument has
initiated highly controversial discussions in many coun-
tries, since co-payments and cost sharing schemes are fre-
quently applied as a 'one-size-fits-it-all' tool in health
politics, often disregarding the potential for jeopardizing
health care especially for the poor. It is very difficult, of
course, to determine a level of co-payment that discour-
ages unnecessary utilization of services, and that does not
discourage patients from seeking medical services they
really need [23]. A growing body of literature suggests that
co-payments may adversely affect health outcomes [24].
To date, the RAND-Study, conducted in California during
the 1970s, is regarded as a fundamental investigation on
moral hazard in health insurance [25]. 5,809 US citizens
were randomly assigned to 14 different health insurance
contracts (with different co-payment modalities) and
their consequent behaviour was documented for three to
five years. One interesting result was that patients with
higher co-payments abstained from necessary physician
visits and had worse health outcomes in the end (e.g. con-
cerning their teeth, blood pressure and eye sight). Further-
more, cost sharing had particularly negative effects on
people with low income and shortened the lifetime of
high risk patients [26]. The negative effect of co-payments
Table 2: Multivariate logistic models (complete cases only)
Model 1
outcome: 'delayed or avoided'
Model 2
outcome: 'delayed or avoided'
subgroup with chronic disease
Model 3
outcome: 'delayed'
Model 4
outcome: 'avoided'
N 7,198 3,542 7,198 7,198
odds ratio (95% CI)
Age (years) under 30 3.46 (2.72–4.39) 3.35 (2.28–4.94) 1.46 (1.13–1.90) 5.44 (3.69–8.01)
Gender male 0.98 (0.89–1.09) 1.13 (0.97–1.31) 0.90 (0.80–1.00) 1.12 (0.98–1.27)
Per capita Income (Euro)
< 600 2.31 (1.98–2.70) 2.45 (1.90–3.15) 1.45 (1.22–1.72) 2.20 (1.81–2.68)
600–800 1.73 (1.48–2.01) 1.81 (1.45–2.28) 1.41 (1.19–1.67) 1.59 (1.29–1.96)
800–1,000 1.31 (1.11–1.55) 1.46 (1.14–1.87) 1.24 (1.03–1.49) 1.20 (0.95–1.52)
1,000–1,300 1.39 (1.19–1.63) 1.47 (1.17–1.85) 1.27 (1.06–1.51) 1.29 (1.04–1.61)
HAWa little 1.28 (1.05–1.57) 1.94 (1.38–2.74) 0.68 (0.53–0.87) 2.09 (1.66–2.63)
SAHb very good 1.13 (0.95–1.34) 1.22 (0.93–1.61) 1.17 (0.97–1.41) 1.02 (0.81–1.29)
Chronic disease no 1.13 (0.99–1.28) - 0.84 (0.73–0.96) 1.53 (1.30–1.80)
Maximum co-payment 1% no 1.77 (1.50–2.09) 1.71 (1.43–2.04) 1.57 (1.31–1.88) 1.59 (1.22–2.08)
survey spring 2006 1.95 (1.65–2.31) 1.88 (1.47–2.42) 2.56 (2.12–3.10) 0.86 (0.69–1.07)
c-value 0.69 0.70 0.62 0.72
H/Lc p-value 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.31
Pseudo R2 Nagelkerke 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.15
Pseudo R2 McFadden 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.10
a Health awareness, b Self assessed health, c Hosmer Lemeshow test
Comparison groups: age: over 70; gender: female; per capita income: > 1,300 Euro; HAW: strong; SAH: poor; chronic disease: yes; max. co-
payment of 1%: yes; survey: spring 2004BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
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especially for socioeconomically disadvantaged groups
could also be seen e.g. in studies from Israel [27,28],
South Korea [29], France [30,31] and Denmark [32]. In
Austria and the Netherlands, some co-payments have
been abolished after thorough evaluation, because they
turned out to deter socio-economically disadvantaged
patients from physician visits [33]. A study in Canada doc-
uments that an increase of cost-sharing for prescribed
drugs resulted in a decrease in essential medication
among poor and elderly patients [34]. A decrease in the
utilization of life-sustaining drugs was also found in an
international Cochrane review including 21 studies [35].
Thus, there is increasing evidence of serious adverse effects
that could ultimately lead to higher health care expendi-
tures.
In a discussion paper on European strategies for tackling
social inequities in health, the WHO states that denying
access to effective health care is a denial of human rights.
Nevertheless, the existence of inequities in access to health
care can even be found in the most advanced welfare sys-
tems in Europe [36]. A health care system is needed that
guarantees basic, affordable health care coverage for all
citizens without discriminating specific socio-economic
groups. Co-payments may pose a major threat to this prin-
ciple of solidarity, they could lead to increasing health
inequalities, and also to higher health care cost for disad-
vantaged population groups in the long run. It would be
important to assess these potential problems in more
detail, and in advance (e.g. by conducting health inequal-
ity impact assessments before a reform such as the 'Praxis-
gebuehr' is implemented). The financial resources are
limited, of course, and in some circumstances co-pay-
ments could be helpful for adjusting the provision of
health care services to health care needs. They should not
be an instrument for increasing health inequalities,
though.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of our study are in line with
other studies, indicating that practice charges for physi-
cian visits and other co-payments could jeopardize health
care utilization, especially among socially deprived
groups. Apparently, even a relatively small amount of
money could detain patients from physician visits (and
also unsettle the relationship between the patient and the
physician).
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' contributions
JB has kindly provided the data and revised the manu-
script. The project was drafted, initiated and supervised by
AM, who also contributed to the manuscript.
In the course of her master thesis in Public Health, IMR
carried out the statistic analysis, prepared and edited the
script. All authors read and approved the final manu-
script.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Bertelsmann foundation for providing the data 
and permissions to realise this analysis.
References
1. Germany's need for health-care reforms.  Lancet 2005,
366:1411.
2. Reiners H, Schnee M: Hat die Praxisgebühr eine nachhaltige
Steuerungswirkung?  In Gesundheitsmonitor 2007 Gesundheitsver-
sorgung und Gestaltungsoptionen aus der Perspektive von Bevölkerung und
Ärzten Edited by: Böcken J, Braun B, Amhof R. Güthersloh: Verlag Ber-
telsmann Stiftung; 2007:133-154. 
3. van Doorslaer E, Masseria C, Koolman X: Inequalities in access to
medical care by income in developed countries.  Cmaj 2006,
174:177-183.
4. Mielck A: Soziale Ungleichheit und Gesundheit: Einführung in die aktuelle
Diskussion Bern, Göttingen, Toronto, Seattle: Verlag Hans Huber;
2005. 
5. Amhof R: Anreize im Gesundheitswesen: Haben sie die
gewünschten Effekte?  Gesundheitsmonitor Ein Newsletter der Bertels-
mann Stiftung 2006, 2/2006:.
6. Gebhardt B: Zwischen Steuerungswirkung und Sozialver-
träglichkeit – eine Zwischenbilanz zur Praxisgebühr aus
Sicht der Versicherten.  In Gesundheitsmonitor 2005 Die ambulante
Versorgung aus Sicht von Bevölkerung und Ärzteschaft Edited by: Böcken
J, Braun B, Schnee M, Amhof R. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stif-
tung; 2005:11-31. 
7. Streich W: Reaktionen auf die Praxisgebühr – was antworten
die Betroffenen?  Gesundheitsmonitor Ein Newsletter der Bertelsmann
Stiftung 2004, 2/04:.
8. Zok K: Nach der Wirkung gefragt: Die Reform kommt an.
Gesundheit und Gesellschaft 2004, 7:38-41.
9. Zok K: Das Arzt-Inanspruchnahmeverhalten nach Ein-
führung der Praxisgebühr. Ergebnisse aus zwei Repräsenta-
tivumfragen unter 3.000 GKV-Versicherten.  WIdO-monitor
2005, 2:1-7.
10. Augurzky B, Bauer TK, Schaffner S: Copayments in the German
Health System: Does it work?  IZA Discussion Paper 2006,
2290:1-17.
11. Timm U, Körner T, Meyer I: Armut und Lebensbedingungen.
Ergebnisse aus LEBEN IN EUROPA für Deutschland 2005.
Statistisches Bundsamt, Wiesbaden 2006.
12. Holst J: Kostenbeteiligung für Patienten – Reformansatz ohne
Evidenz! Theoretische Betrachtungen und empirische
Befunde aus Industrieländern.  Veröffentlichungsreihe der Forsc-
hungsgruppe Public Health, Schwerpunkt Arbeit, Sozialstruktur und Sozial-
staat, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2008.
13. Sociopolitical goals and perspectives of the Bertelsmann
Stiftung        [http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-
0A000F0A-AFC44F58/bst/xcms_bst_dms_16798_16799_2.pdf]. last
access November 2008
14. Güther B: Gesundheitsmonitor – Stichprobe und Erhebungs-
methode sowie Qualitätsaspekte der Ergebnisse.  In Gesund-
heitsmonitor 2005 Gesundheitsversorgung und Gestaltungsoptionen aus
der Perspektive von Bevölkerung und Ärzten Edited by: Böcken J, Braun
B, Schnee M, Amhof R. Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung;
2006:309-322. 
15. Trojan A, Nickel S, Amhof R, Bocken J: [Social factors influencing
participation in self-help groups or organisations–results
from selected questions for the health monitor].  Gesundheits-
wesen 2006, 68:364-375.
16. Böcken J, Braun B, Amhof R, Schnee M, Eds: Gesundheitsmonitor 2006.
Gesundheitsversorgung und Gestaltungsoptionen aus der Perspektive von
Bevölkerung und Ärzten Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung; 2006. 
17. Helmert U, Strube H: [The development of obesity in Germany
in the period from 1985 until 2000].  Gesundheitswesen 2004,
66:409-415.Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:232 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232
Page 13 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
18. Helmert U, Buitkamp M: [Changes in smoking habits in Ger-
many between 1985 and 2002].  Gesundheitswesen 2004,
66:102-106.
19. Potthoff P, Heinemann LAJ, Güther B: A household panel as a tool
for cost-effective health-related population surveys: validity
of the "Healthcare Access Panel".  German Medical Science 2004,
2:.
20. Hair JF, Anderson R, Tatham RL, Black WC: Multivariate Data Analysis
Upper Saddle River, NJ : Prentice Hall; 2006. 
21. Pauly M: The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment.  American
Economic Review 1968, 58:531-537.
22. Reiners H: Der Homo oeconomicus im Gesundheitswesen.
Veröffentlichungsreihe der Forschungsgruppe Public Health 2006,
305:1-37.
23. Huston CJ: Quality health care in an era of limited resources.
Challenges and opportunities.  J Nurs Care Qual 2003,
18:295-301.
24. Braithwaite RS, Rosen AB: Linking cost sharing to value: an unri-
valed yet unrealized public health opportunity.  Ann Intern Med
2007, 146:602-605.
25. Newhouse JP, Manning WG, Morris CN, Orr LL, Duan N, Keeler EB,
Leibowitz A, Marquis KH, Marquis MS, Phelps CE, Brook RH: Some
interim results from a controlled trial of cost sharing in health insurance R-
2847-HHS. Health insurance experiment series, RAND Corporation Santa
Monica; 1982. 
26. Holst J: Kostenbeteiligung für Patienten – Reformansatz ohne
Evidenz! Theoretische Betrachtungen und empirische
Befunde aus Industrieländern.  Veröffentlichungsreihe der Forsc-
hungsgruppe Public Health, Schwerpunkt Arbeit, Sozialstruktur und Sozial-
staat, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 2007.
27. Vardy DA, Freud T, Shvartzman P, Sherf M, Spilberg O, Goldfarb D,
Mor-Yosef S: Introducing co-payment for consultant specialist
services.  Isr Med Assoc J 2006, 8:558-562.
28. Vardy DA, Freud T, Sherf M, Spilberg O, Goldfarb D, Cohen AD,
Mor-Yosef S, Shvartzman P: A co-payment for consultant serv-
ices: primary care physicians' referral actualization.  J Med Syst
2008, 32:37-41.
29. Kim J, Ko S, Yang B: The effects of patient cost sharing on
ambulatory utilization in South Korea.  Health Policy 2005,
72:293-300.
30. Lostao L, Regidor E, Geyer S, Aiach P: Patient cost sharing and
social inequalities in access to health care in three western
European countries.  Soc Sci Med 2007, 65:367-376.
31. Lostao L, Regidor E, Geyer S, Aiach P: Patient cost sharing and
physician visits by socioeconomic position: findings in three
Western European countries.  J Epidemiol Community Health 2007,
61:416-420.
32. Gundgaard J: Income-related inequality in utilization of health
services in Denmark: evidence from Funen County.  Scand J
Public Health 2006, 34:462-471.
33. Delnoij DM, Groenewegen PP, Ros CC, Hutten JB, Friele RD: Co-
pay regulation in the Netherlands health regulation: an eval-
uation of the effects.  Gesundheitswesen 2000, 62:39-44.
34. Tamblyn R, Laprise R, Hanley JA, Abrahamowicz M, Scott S, Mayo N,
Hurley J, Grad R, Latimer E, Perreault R, McLeod P, Huang A, Laro-
chelle P, Mallet L: Adverse events associated with prescription
drug cost-sharing among poor and elderly persons.  JAMA
2001, 285:421-429.
35. Austvoll-Dahlgren A, Aaserud M, Vist G, Ramsay C, Oxman AD,
Sturm H, Kosters JP, Vernby A: Pharmaceutical policies: effects
of cap and co-payment on rational drug use.  Cochrane Database
Syst Rev 2008:CD007017.
36. Dahlgren G, Whitehead M: Levelling up (part 2): a discussion
paper on European strategies for tackling social inequities in
health.  WHO Collaborating Centre for Policy Research and Social Deter-
minants of Health, University of Liverpool 2006.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/232/pre
pub